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ARTICLES
CAPTIVE COURTS: THE DESTRUCTION
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS BY
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
JILL E. FISCH*
INTRODUCTION

Some Articles in this colloquium issue examine the role of se
crecy in environmental litigation. There are many ways that parties
to any lawsuit can keep the information and results of the litigation
confidential. These include conducting discovery under the protec
tion of confidentiality agreements, settling cases prior to trial and
having the court file and pleadings placed under seal, and engaging
in methods of alternative dispute resolution that do not leave a pub
lic record. 1 All these procedures have been criticized as interfering
with the public's right to know about the case and its outcome. 2
Defenders of secrecy respond that the conduct of the litigation is
properly left to the parties and that, so long as they agree to secrecy,
there has been no harm to the judicial process. 3 They further claim
* Associate Professor, Fordham U niversity School of Law. B.A., 1 982 , Cor
nell U niversity; J .D ., I985, Yale Law School.
1 See, e.g., The Terms of Secrecy, WASH . PosT, Oct. 23, 1 988, at A22 {describ
ing methods of resolving litigation in secret).
2 See, e.g., Philip Carrizosa, Making the Law Disappear, CAL . LAW . , Sept.
I989, at 65 (describing depublication of judicial opinions in California); Elizabeth
Kolbert, Chief Judge of New York Urges Less Secrecy in Civil Settlements, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1 990, at AI (quoting New York Chief Judge Sol Wachtler and
others criticizing secrecy of records in civil cases that have been settled); Benjamin
Weiser, Forging a 'Covenant of Silence'; Secret Settlement Shrouds Health Impact
of Xerox Plant Leak, WASH . PosT, Mar. I 3, I989, at AI {describing the secret
settlement of a l awsuit which involved allegations that a Xerox facility leaked toxic
chemicals into the groundwater, causing health problems for two families , and how
that secrecy is hampering attempts by scientists and the public to learn about the
effects of hazardous chemicals) .
3 This argument is consistent with the autonomy model of litigation in which
the litigants are the final arbiters of the prog ress of their litigation. See Federal
Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. G roup, Inc., 8 1 9 F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. I987) {defer
ring to parties' interests in g ranting vacatur); Nestle Co. v. Ches ter's Mkt., Inc.,
756 F.2d 2 80 {2d Cir. 1 985) (holding that district court abused its discretion in
denying parties' joint motion to vacate).
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that confidentiality serves a broader public policy, that of encourag
ing settlement. 4 In this era of excessive litigation, settlement offers
a prompter and less costly resolution of disputes, which is consis
tent with the public interest.

As courts held hostage to over

crowded dockets search for ways to lighten their load, they are
lil.cely to remain receptive to litigants' requests for secrecy.
In the process of approving secrecy requests, however, courts
can lose sight of the purpose behind their deference to the parties'
wishes. This has led to a peculiar practice in which courts agree to
destroy actual decisions in accordance with a settlement agreement
by the parties. The settlement of a case after a decision has been
rendered, whether as a result of a motion for summary judgment or
a full trial, does not involve the same balance of interests as earlier
requests for secrecy. Moreover, erasing a decision at the request of
the parties threatens the integrity of the judicial process.

It is this

method of obtaining litigation secrecy, through the destruction of
judicial decisions, that is the focus of this Article.
I
DESTRUCTION OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The process of erasing a judicial decision varies somewhat de
pending on the applicable jurisdiction, although the results are gen
erally the same. In the federal courts and many state courts,5 the
parties may settle the litigation prior to or pending appeal. In ac
cordance with their settlement, the parties then ask either the trial
court or the appellate court to vacate the prior judgment, opinion,
or both. 6

In some states, additional procedures for erasure are

available. For example, the California Supreme Court will, under
certain circumstances, order that an opinion by a lower appellate
court be "depublished. " 7 Finally, courts have occasionally been
4

See, e.g.,

Gina Kolata, Secrecy Orders in Lawsuits Prompt States' Efforts to
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 8, 1 992, at DlO (quoting trial lawyers who
defend the use of secrecy orders on the theory that they induce parties to settle and
reduce litigation) .
5 State courts often look to federal courts for guidance in this area. See, e.g.,
V an Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Fulenwider, 798 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1 990) (citing fed
eral decisions on mootness and vacatur) .
6 For a detailed description o f this process, see Jill Fisch, Rewriting History:
Restrict Their Use,

The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law through Settlement and Vacatur,
76

CoRNELL L. REv . 589, 593-99 ( 1 99 1) .
7 CAL . R . CT . 976(c)(2) allows the California Supreme Court simply to order
that the lower court opinion not be published . The practice, which appears to be
unique to California and is us ually executed in response to a letter or petition re-
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persuaded that their obligation to encourage settlement requires
them to defer still further to the parties' request and actually rewrite
a decision to conform to the litigants' wishes. Based on this reason
ing, the California Supreme Court recently reversed a jury verdict
based on the parties' stipulated request. 8
The effect of these procedures is the same. The litig2.tion be
tween the particular litigants is resolved in accordance with a settle
ment agreement. Any finding of liability or wrongdoing is erased,
and the parties are relieved of any accountability for it. The deci
sion ceases to have preclusive effect against the parties and cannot
be used in subsequent litigation by or against them.9 Additionally,
the public value of the decision is diminished. The court's opinion
may be physically removed from the record books or, if retained,
may bear no explanation of the rationale behind the decision to va
cate.1 0 Thus future litigants seeking to rely on the opinion's analy
sis are left without an indication as to whether vacatur was the
result of subsequent judicial doubts about the validity of that analy
sis. Accordingly, few courts give respect even to the analysis of a
quest from one of the parties, precludes the opinion from being published i n the
official California Appellate Reports. See Stacy G or don, Only Calzfornia Allows
Justices to 'Depublish , Bus. INs., June 15, 1 992, at 14; Carrizosa, supra note 2. I n
addition, the Rules o f Court prohibit the depublished opinion from being cited as
binding precedent for any other case . CAL R. CT . 977(a). As one commentator
explains: "the opinion just disappears." Carri zosa, supra note 2, at 66.
8 See Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal ., 834 P.2d 1 19, 128 (Cal. 1 992).
Documents submitted to the court in Neary i ndicated that California courts of
appeal had reversed trial court decisions at the request of the litigants 12 times
duri ng a four year period. !d. at 129 (Kennard, J ., dissenting). The supreme court
in Neary claimed its efforts did not constitute rewri ting or erasure. !d. at 124
(claiming that "a stipulated reversal is not an attempt to erase or rewrite the record
of trial ... "). Given the fact that the court affirmatively reve rsed the trial court
decision, this disclaimer is not convincing.
9 See generally William D. Zeller, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement
Conditioned Upon the Vacatur of Entered Judgments, 96 YALE L.J. 860 ( 1987) .
Cf Cal . R. Ct. 977 (a depublished decision, under the California rules, does retain
precl usi ve, although not precedential effect).
10 See Fisch, supra note 6, at 620 n.l63, describing the process by which courts
can destroy any indication that a vacated decision ever e xisted. The editor's note
located at 724 F. Supp. 209 is illustrative:
EDITOR'S NOTE: The opi nion of the U nited States District Court,
S.D.N.Y., Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund v. Akaty Construc
tion Corp., published in the advance sheet at this ci tation, 724 F. Supp. 209224, was withdrawn from the bound volume because the opinion was vacated
and withdrawn by orde r of the Court.
If a decision is vacated before the advance sheets are printed, the record books will
lack even this minimal evidence of its existence.
'
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decision that has been vacated. 1 1
Judicial decisions have particular value in environmental litiga
tion, and secrecy in en·;ironmental cases is therefore a matter of
public concern. In many environmental law suits, courts must in
terpret complex statutes such as the Comprehensive Environmental
Response,

Compensation,

and

Liability

Act

(CERCLA

or

Superfund).12 Courts must wrestle with complicated questions of
insurance coverage and evaluate unfolding scientific evidence on the
effects of chemicals and toxic substances. Expert testimony is often
necessary and public expenditures in terms of judicial resources are
considerable. 1 3
When an environmental decision i s vacated, the public loses
the resources that were expended not merely to resolve the dispute,
but to develop the law. This is particularly true when the decision
has addressed issues of first impression. 1 4 Litigation in environmen
tal insurance cases, for example, illustrates the success of insurers in
retarding the development of the law, a process which is costly to
the policyholder.1 5 Finally, to the extent that civil litigation oper
ates to develop and enforce public values, the destruction of deci
sions thwarts such efforts.16
II See Fisch, supra note 6, at 6 15-24. But see Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 75 1
F. Supp. 1454, 1 465 n . 2 3 (D. Colo. 1 990), affd in part and rev'd in part, 937 F.2d
498 ( lOth Cir. 1 99 1) (relying on the vacated district court opinion in Tosco Corp.
v. Hodel, 6 1 1 F. Supp. 1 1 30 (D. Colo. 1 985), for its analysis).
1 2 42 U .S.C. §§ 960 1-96 75 ( 1 9 88 & Supp. I I I 1 99 1). CERCLA imposes retro
active liability on companies for the costs of cleaning up h azardous waste.
1 3 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Garcia, Big Rock Mesa Landslide Case a Mega-Trial,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1 0, 1 9 88, § I , at 1 (describing time and expenses associated with
preparing for and trying a large landslide case in California); J ack B. Weinstein,
Factors in Determining the Degree of Public Availability of Judicial Opinions, 2
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 244, 246- 49 ( 1 993) .
1 4 Thus, for example, destruction o f the appellate court decision i n Montrose
Chern. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 364 (Ct . App.), review
granted, 1 992 Cal. LEXIS 2554 ( 1 992), would require subsequent litigants to start
from scratch on the issues addressed in the opinion, such as the interpretation of
"trigger of coverage." See Letter from Kevin W:ilsh to California Supreme Court
re Montrose Chern. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. in Opposition to Request for Depub
lication at 2 (Apr. 8, 1 992) (on file with author). See also infra Part IV .C.
1 5 See infra Part IV. C.
1 6 See Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 H A RV . L. REV. 4 ( 1 9 82) (describing civil litiga
tion as developing and enforcing public values and citing examples such as school
desegregation, antitrust, and environmental law).
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II
THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE SETTLEMENT
PROCESS

In an earlier piece,1 7 I described the settlement of litigation in
economic terms, under which a party will agree to settle if his or her
expected gain from settlement exceeds the expected judgment less
the costs of obtaining that judgment. A party's calculation of the
expected judgment can be described as:

n
V

2:
1

=

p(n)J(n) + c(t)

(equation 1)

where,
V

the expected value to be obtained at the conclusion of the

=

litigation; 1 8
J(n)

=

the range of possible judgments, with each J being one possi

ble judgment; 19
p(n)
c(t)

=

=

the probability of obtaining a given judgment J (n); and
a negative number representing the cost of continuing to

pursue the litigation to its conclusion at any given time t (rather
than settling or voluntarily discontinuing the lawsuit).
Thus, at any point in the litigation, a defendant should be able to
persuade a plaintiff to settle by offering the plaintiff the ad damnum
discounted both by the plaintiff's perceived risk that the lawsuit will
be unsuccessful and by the costs of pursuing the litigation to final
judgment. Prior to trial, settlement may not be possible, however,
because the parties' perceptions of the likelihood of success may
vary.
The settlement process is greatly simplified after a trial court
has reached a decision on liability. At this point, much of the po
tential error associated with calculating the expected value of the
judgment has been removed, subject only to the possibility the judg
ment will be modified or reversed on appeal. 2 0 Post-decision then,
17

Fisch, supra note 6.
This number represents, in quantified terms, the relief sought by t he litigant.
This rel ief may be legal, such as damages for pollution, or equitable, such as an
injunction against further dumping. The expected value will be positive for a plain
tiff who expects a net gain from the litigation, and negative for the defendant who
views the expected judgment as a cost.
19 The range of J (n) includes negative numbers for possible adverse judgements.
See supra note 1 8 .
20 This risk is relatively small. The vast majority of t rial court decisions are
18
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it is relatively easy for plaintiff and defendant

to

agree

on

t he ex

pected judgment.
The foregoing calculation may be complicated, however, by
several factors. First, an adverse judgment may result in collateral
costs to a party. If a judgment of liability is associated with a loss of
reputation, a finding of immoral or improper conduct, or dimin
ished rights or benefits, the defendant may view the judgment as
imposing greater costs than the amount of the verdict.

In such a

case, the defendant's calculation of the costs of the verdict might be
adjusted to read:21

n
V=

2:
1

p(n)[J(n) + K(n)) + c(t)

(equation 2)

where K(n) is a negative number which represents the collateral
costs to the defendant of a particular adverse judgment J(n).
Second, the process is complicated if the litigation is not a one
shot event. If an unfavorable verdict at trial will have adverse col
lateral consequences, such as collateral estoppel effect in other re
lated cases, or the resolution of a legal issue that will affect the
litigant elsewhere, the litigant must take into account not merely
the cost associated with the instant judgment, but the effect of that
judgment on the related cases. This might cause the formula to
read as:

n
V=

2:
1

X

p(n) [J(n) +

2:

V (x, J(n))) + c(t)

(equation 3)

1

where V(x, J(n)) represents the expected verdict in each of the x
other cases affected adversely by judgment J(n). In either situation,
the circumstances impose asymmetrical costs upon the litigants, as
the potential harm to the defendant from an adverse judgment is
much greater than the potential gain to the plaintiff.
III
THE EFFECT OF ASYMMETRICAL COSTS ON
SETTLEMENT

The impact of asymmetrical costs imposed upon litigants by a
affirmed on appeal. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 5 9 5 n.25.
2 1 The equation has been adjusted to reflect the fact that the total cost imposed
on an unsuccessful defendant is the judgment, plus the litigation costs, plus the
collateral costs.
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judicial decision is considerable. Normally we trust the adversary
process to produce settlements that are fair to both parties. 22
Coase's theorem suggests that, if the liability rule is clear (which it
is post-decision), and the transaction costs are minimal, the parties
will bargain to reach an efficient resolution of the litigation. 23 But
in the scenario in which the decision imposes large asymmetrical
costs upon the defendant, the plaintiffs bargaining position is en
hanced. Instead of being able to obtain a settlement amount up to
the amount of the judgment, reduced by the costs and uncertainty
associated with appellate review, the plaintiff can extort a larger
payment if he or she can offer to have the adverse decision
destroyed. 24
The risk of this distortion to the settlement process is not hypo
thetical. In Bankers Trust Co.

v.

Hartford Accident and Indemnity

Co., 25 the plaintiff sought insurance coverage for the cost of cor

recting pollution damage to a river caused by a leaking fuel oil pipe.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and, pending a motion for rehearing, the case was settled
conditioned on vacatur of the summary judgment decision. Seven
years later, in an affidavit filed in another case, counsel for Bankers
Trust revealed that the settlement agreement had resulted in Hart
ford paying Bankers Trust approximately $200,000 more than the
value of Bankers Trust's claim, with the understanding that the
opinion finding Hartford liable would be withdrawn. 26
This bargaining process presents a problem because the judicial
decision is public propertyY By offering to have that decision de22

Naturally the imperfections of the judicial system frequently impose pres
sures on litigants to accept settlements that may not be fair. The settlement pro
cess has been criticized, for example, as favoring litigants who come to the process
with a better bargai ning position, such as greater resources or no need for prompt
resolution of the dispute. An analysis of the limitations of the settlement process is
beyond the scope of this Article.
23 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. I, 4
( 1960).
2 4 See, e.g., Vacatur i s "Bargaining Chip" i n Post-Judgment Settlements, 7 Civ.
Trial Man. (BNA) No. 14, at 300 (Aug. 7, 199 1 ) (describing increased popularity
of post-judgment vacatur) .
25 5 1 8 F. Su pp. 37 1 , vacated, 62 1 F. Supp. 685 (S. D.N.Y. 19 8 1).
26 See Intel Corp. v . Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1 1 7 1, 1 19 2
n . 3 2 (N.D. Cal. 19 8 8) (describing contents o f affidavit b y counsel for Bankers
Trust and terms of settlement agreement in Bankers Trust case).
27 See Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dep't of Heal th & Hu man Servs., 862
F. 2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir . 19 88) ("The precedent, a public act of a public official, is
not the parties' property.").
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strayed, the plaintiff obtains a windfall benefit, at the cost of others
who would benefit from the decision, including other similarly situ
ated litigants and the public at large. Cease's theorem fails because
third party beneficiaries of the decision are not party to the agree
ment to have it destroyed.
Allowing destruction of judicial decisions also affects the initial
settlement process. A defendant who faces a strong possibility of
costly collateral consequences if she loses at trial is likely to settle
early to avoid that risk.

If the defendant can avoid the conse

quences of an adverse judgment by buying his or her way out of it,
there is less incentive to avoid trial altogether. This "free" roll of
the dice increases the litigation expenses of both litigants at the
costly pretrial and trial level and causes needless consumption of
judicial resources.28 Additionally, where the parties are of unequal
bargaining position, the defendant's ability to delay resolution by
proceeding to a risk-free trial may enable the defendant to force the
plaintiff to settle for even less.
IV
THE ROLE OF VACATUR IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION
The validity of the foregoing model is peculiarly evident in en
vironmental litigation. Increasingly, parties to environmental litiga28 Court s frequently defend their decisions to vacate on the ground that settle
ment conditioned on vacatur conserves judicial resources. See Nestle Co. v.
Chester's Mkt . , Inc., 756 F.2d 2 80 , 2 84 (2d Cir. 1 985) (concl uding that granting
parties' request to vacate is justified by the importance of p romoting settlement).
Where parties have consumed the considerable judicial resources necessary to p ro
duce a trial court judgment, such arguments are less compelling. The p arties in
Neary v. Regents of the U niversity of California, 834 P.2d 1 1 9 (Cal . 1 992), for
example, spent more t han 1 2 years in litigation. Prior to the jury trial , which
lasted four months, the case reached the appellate division on appeal of a motion
for summary j udgment. Settlement of the case on appeal did not mitigate t his
substantial consumption of j udicial resources.
Moreover, the practice of permitting vacatur encourages p arties to delay set
tlement until after trial. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 635-38. As Justice Kennard
explained:
If an adverse judgment can be deleted by a postjudgment settlement with
stipulated reversal , p arties concerned about the collateral consequences of an
adverse judgment will have l ess incentive to settle their cases before trial and
j udgment. Cases that would have settled pretrial, with minim al j udicial in
volvement , will be tried before a court or jury, perhaps for days or even
months, only to have the court or j ury's considered decision erased by a stip
ulated reversal .
Neary, 834 P.2d at 1 29 (Kennard, J., dissent ing).
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tion are using vacatur and related processes to destroy decisions
they find unsatisfactory. The growing role of these practices in en
vironmental litigation can be explained by several factors.
A.

Erasing the Finding of Wrongdoing

One factor that explains the use of vacatur is the public appro
bation given to those who pollute or cause other environmental
harm. Public condemnation of defendants found liable for environ
mental damage operates as a collateral cost, such as that addressed
in equation 2 above. Even in situations where the plaintiff's sole
motive is receipt of compensation, the defendant may seek to have
the decision destroyed to preserve her good name.
Defendants in Neary

v.

R egents of the University of Calzfornia29

justified their request for stipulated reversal on these grounds.

In

Neary, plaintiff's herd of cattle had been treated with an insecticide

to prevent a mite infestation. After the treatment, a large number
of cattle died.

Neary attributed the deaths to the treatment and,

eventually, state agricultural officials agreed to have the matter in
vestigated by veterinarians employed by the University of Califor
nia.30 Three university veterinarians investigated the incident and
subsequently wrote a report attributing the deaths to Neary's mis
management rather than pesticide poisoning. 31

The report was

published under the California Public Records Act. 32
Neary sued both the University and the veterinarians for libel.
After twelve years of litigation, including a four-month jury trial, he
obtained a verdict against all defendants for $7 million.33 The de
fendants appealed and, while the appeal was pending, offered to set
tle the case for $3 million, conditioned on the court entering an
order, based on the parties' stipulation, reversing the jury verdict
and dismissing the case with prejudice. 34 Neary, who was reaching
an advanced age and tiring of the protracted litigation, agreed. 35
According to the California Appellate Division, the condition
that the jury verdict be reversed was imposed by the individual de
fendant veterinarians. Defendants' counsel explained the rationale
29

30
31

278 Cal. Rptr. 773 ( Ct. App . 1991), rev'd, 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992).
Neary, 834 P.2d at 131 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Jd.

32

CAL. Gov'T CODE tit. 1, div. 7, §§ 6250-6254.2 (West 1993).
278 Cal. Rptr. at 777.
34 834 P.2d at 120.
33

35 The defendants had already received permission to file over-length briefs on
appeal. Jd . at 122.
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for this request as follows:

[R]eversal of the Superior Court's judgment is particularly im
portant to the individual Appellants. Because they view the
jury's verdict as a determination that they, along with a dozen
other University scientists, knowingly and deliberately partici
pated in writing a false scientific report, they believe the verdict
has severely blemished their professional reputations and, as a
result, significantly impaired their ability to function as produc
tive members of the scientific community . . . 36
.

Unlike the Appellate Division, the California Supreme Court did
not see a need to retain the jury verdict of liability. In spite of the
fact that the veterinarians were public officials, whose professional
reputations depend on their ability to evaluate accurately the envi
ronmental impact of the state's pesticide program, the court did not
see a need to preserve the jury's findings. Apparently the court at
tached no value to the jury's determination that the veterinarians
had deliberately falsified their scientific findings in attempting to
blame the cattle deaths on mismanagement rather than the state
agricultural department's use of a dangerous insecticide. 37
A desire to avoid the public condemnation associated with en
vironmental wrongdoing may also explain the activities of the Envi
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) and ARCO in Kitlutsisti

v.

AR CO Alaska, Inc. 38 Plaintiffs sued ARCO and Exxon under the

citizen suit provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. 39 The EPA was joined as a party defendant based on its failure
to process the defendants' applications for drilling permits under
the statute.40
After the district court found that ARCO and Exxon had ille
gally discharged pollutants into Norton Sound and that the EPA
had failed to perform its duties under the statute in processing per
mit applications,41 the EPA promptly issued the defendants a drill-

36

278 Cal . Rptr. at 775.
834 P.2d at 131 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Here, the majority has deter

3 7 See

mined that the trial court's judgment has no val ue worth p reserving.").
3 8 592 F. Supp. 832, 835-37 (D. Alaska 1984), vacated, 782 F.2d 800 (9th Cir.
1986).
39 33 U.S. C. § 1365 (1982), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 1365 ( 1988).
40 592 F. Supp . at 836.
41 Id. at 838- 44 (holding that the EPA violated its statutory dut y and finding

that the EPA had repeatedl y "been using 'creative' administ rative techniques of
dubious legality to avoid [its) clear statutory mandate . . . of issuing NPDES
permits.").
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ing permit, mooting the controversy.42

20 1
The defendants43 then

requested the court to vacate the district court decision, and the
court agreed.44 One wonders whether the possibility of erasing the
lower court finding of wrongdoing by the EPA influenced the
EPA's decision to issue the drilling permit, which allowed the de
fendants to "discharge a large amount of pollutants into the
water."45
The consequence of the disappearing decisions in both Neary
and Kitlutsisti is that public officials found liable for wrongdoing
were aliowed to preserve clean reputations. The public cost of this
practice is the loss of their accountability.
B.

A voiding the Consequences of Collateral Estoppel

Parties to environmental litigation may also seek to have deci
sions destroyed because of their collateral estoppel effect on subse
quent litigation.

Like products liability and other mass torts,

environmental cases frequently involve a single incident or transac
tion that has allegedly caused harm to a large group of plaintiffs.
Thus a readily-identifiable group of plaintiffs will benefit from the
collateral estoppel effect of a finding of liability.46 This places the
defendant in the equation 3 scenario where failure to destroy the
adverse decision will result in virtually certain liability in the many
subsequent cases.47
Vacatur can also operate in the reverse direction, destroying a
decision that has freed the defendant from liability. While preclu42

782 F.2d at 80 1 .
Plaintiffs objected t o vacatur o f the dist rict court decision. Id.
44 782 F.2d at 802.
4 5 592 F. Supp. at 835.
46 See , e. g., Zeller, supra note 9, at 878 (illustrating this with a mass asbestos
tort hypothetical ).
47 See generally Fisch, supra note 6 (discussing the offensive collateral estoppel
doctrine and the implications of vacatur on preclusion); Zeller, supra note 9
(same). Some schol ars have criticized application of offensive collateral estoppel in
mass tort and environmental claims on the grounds that a single unfavorable result
has disastrous implications for the defendant. See , e.g., Brainerd Currie, Mutualit y
of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of t he Bernhard Do ctrine , 9 STAN. L. REV. 2 8 1
( 1 9 57) (describing potential unfairness i n litigating liability for railroad accident
sequentially against 50 plaintiffs). But see Fisch, supra note 6, at 622-23 (describ
ing fairness analysis which balances the interests of the public in the finality of
judgments against the interests of private litigants in ending the litigation through
settl ement). See also id. at 623 n. 1 75 (describing support for the offensive collat
eral estoppel doctrine as eliminating t he costly need to relitigate endlessly issues of
liability).
43
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sion doctrines do not bar subsequent plaintiffs from re1itigating is
sues decided in a prior suit to which they were not a party, litigation
in mass tort and other multiparty environmental cases has increas
ingly involved the use of test cases to resolve common questions of
liability.

Under this approach, a single plaintiffs lawsuit may be

litigated with the expectation that the result of that lawsuit will be
authoritative, if not technically binding, in resolving or settling the
remaining cases. 48
Under this scenario, vacatur is damaging because it can leave
the remaining litigants without the precedent they sought. A decer
tification order by the California Supreme Court nearly forced a
massive relitigation in connection with the 1983 Big Rock Mesa
landslide in Malibu, California, which destroyed thirty homes and
damaged two hundred more in the Los Angeles area. A test case
promised to resolve issues important in all 230 lawsuits. 49 .Plaintiff
homeowners in Hansch

v.

County of Los A ngeles50 sued the County

of Los Angeles alleging that government officials had approved de
velopment of the mesa with seepage pits and horizontal drains
rather than sewers, which contributed to a rise in ground water trig
gering the landslide. The parties spent massive sums litigating the
case,51 and the trial resulted in a $2.74 million verdict in favor of
the homeowners, a verdict that exposed county taxpayers to poten
tial liability of $500 million. 52
48

Such test litigation reduces the costs of relitigating a complicated issue.
Hansch v. County of L.A., 247 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811-12 (Ct. App. 1988)
("Hundreds of plaintiffs filed scores of actions for dam ages. These actions were
consolidated. The present action was severed from the others 'for the purpose of
trying it first as a test case.' ") ; Koch-Ash v. Superior Court , 225 Cal . Rptr. 657,
658 (Ct. App. 1986) ("the 'Hansch' action was severed from t he 47 'Ibarra' actions
for the purpose of trying it first as a test case that might resolve various issues of
liability pertaining to the 'Ibarra' actions"). Cf. Garcia, supra note 13 (stating
David Casselman, one of the County's attorneys, claimed that the homeowners'
lawyers had said Hansch would be considered a test case for the other lawsuits and
that the other homeowners would be bound by the verdict; homeowners' lawyer
Kenneth Chiate allegedly denied the statement). The trial judge refused to dismiss
the remaining cases holding that there was insufficient evidence t hat the parties
agreed to be bound by the Hansch outcome, in light of the Supreme Court's order
vacating Hansch. Kenneth J. Garcia, Ruling on Big Ro ck Mesa Case Sets t he
Stage fo r Huge Trial, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1988, § 2, at 10.
50 247 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Ct. App.), revie w denied and depublication o rdered, 1988
Cal. LEXIS 193 (Sept. 15, 1988), and ce rt. dismissed, 489 U . S . 1074 (1989).
51 Kenneth Chiate, the homeowners' lawyer, stated t hat the county spent $5
million defending itself in t he Hansch case. Garcia, s upra note 13. See also Car
rizosa, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting Los Angeles lawyer, Gideon Kanner, "A king's
ransom was spent preparing and trying that case on the merits.").
52 Myrna Oliver, Justices Overturn Aw ard fo r Damage fro m Afalibu Slide , L.A.
49

See
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The trial court decision in Hansch was overturned by the ap
pellate division,53 however, which found that the government's ap
proval of the development plans did not make it liable for the
landslide and which condemned the trial court decision for its
broad imposition upon the public of liability for this type of disas
ter. Rather than reviewing the case, the California Supreme Court
decertified the appellate division opinion,54 leaving both sides with
out a precedent after expending millions of dollars. 55 The entire
litigation was nearly repeated in a mass triaJ56 when the case was
settled for $97 million. 57
C.

R etarding the Development of Case Law

Vacatur also destroys a valuable resource: the prior judicial de
cision. Decisions in environmental cases are particularly valuable
because they frequently involve difficult questions of law and fact.
Environmental cases cause courts to grapple with such issues as the
interpretation and validity of statutes, the interpretation of contract
clauses regarding insurance coverage of pollution clean-up costs,58
and the effects of hazardous substances upon individuals and the
environment. Vacatur has destroyed, for example, the effect of a
comprehensive fifty-six page opinion interpreting and evaluating the
validity of two statutes preventing the operation of the Shoreham
Nuclear Power Plant.59
A sequence of cases involving litigation over rights to oil shale
mining patents under federal mining law illustrates the costs created
TIMES, June 8, 1 988, § 2, at I.
53

247 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Ct. App. 1 988) .
Hansch v. County of L . A . , 1 98 8 Cal. LEXIS 1 93 (Sept. 1 5 , 1 988) (denying
review and ordering appellate division opinion depublished).
55 Carrizosa, supra note 2, at 66.
56 Garcia, supra note 1 3 (describing preparation for the "mega-trial" which was
expected to last two to five years and cost more than $ 1 00 mill ion in attorneys' fees
alone).
57 Kenneth J. Garcia, The Case t hat Wo n't Go Away, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1 9 89, § 9, at I (describing settlement term s). I nterestingly, the Hansches, who had
lost in the appellate division, shared in the settlement. Carrizosa, supra note 2, at
66.
58 On the difficulty of interpreting pollution exclusion clauses to determine in
surance coverage for clean-up costs, see Jonathan C. Averback, Co mparing t he Old
54

and t he Ne w Pollutio n Exclusio n Clauses in General Liability Insurance Policies:

1 4 B . C. ENYTL. AFF. L. REV. 60 1 ( 1 987).
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1 9 87),
vacated in part and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 888 F. 2d 230 (2d Cir.
1 9 89).

New Language-Same Re sults?,
59
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by vacatur. The litigation of these rights has been extremely com
plex, spanning sixty years and involving numerous cases at the trial
and appellate level. 60 The lengthy district court opinion in Tosco
Corp. v. Hodel addressed many difficult issues, yet the Tenth Circuit

vacated the district court opinion when the litigants settled their
dispute pending appeal.61 As a result of the vacatur, many of the
issues resolved in the Tosco opinion subsequently had to be
relitigated. 62
The time and effort invested in resolving these issues is a public
resource, which benefits future actors as well as subsequent liti
gants. The Hansch litigation is a prime example of the importance
of this resource. The value of the decision is only partially captured
in its role as precedent. By clarifying the law, judicial decisions in
form parties as to their rights and responsibilities with regard to the
environment and cause reform of procedures for handling environ
mental problems. Litigation may also advance the state of scientific
knowledge by examining the handling procedures and health effects
of hazardous substances. These benefits are lost and the time and
money expended on environmental lawsuits are squandered when
judicial resolutions of these issues are destroyed.
The ability of litigants to retard the development of the law by
vacating judicial decisions offers a particular opportunity for manip
ulation in environmental litigation. Unlike many areas of the law in
which litigation is a one shot, isolated event in the life of the parties,
litigants in environmental litigation are frequently involved in re
peated similar cases. Such "repeat players" include manufacturers
of hazardous substances, such as toxic chemicals, and insurance
companies who are drawn into litigation when their policies cover
instances of pollution or clean-up costs. For these litigants, envi
ronmental litigation involves more than a resolution of specific
transactions; it involves the development of legal doctrine which
will continue to govern their rights and responsibilities.
Under these circumstances, the repeat players have strong fi60 See, e.g. , Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 7 5 1 F. Supp. 1454, 1 4 5 6 (D. Colo.
1 9 90), a.ffd in pa rt a nd rev'd in part, 937 F.2d 498 ( lOth Cir. 1991).
61 6 1 1 F. Supp. 1 1 30 (D. Colo. 1 9 8 5), va ca ted b y , 826 F.2d 948 ( lOth Cir.
1 9 87).
62 See Maratho n Oil, 7 5 1 F. Supp. at 1 465 n.23 (addressing relitigation of To sco
issues); Russell v. Turnbaugh, 774 F. Supp. 5 97, 599 n.2 (D. Colo. 1 99 1 ) (vacatur
of To sco required relitigation of many issues in Marathon Oil). The court in Mara
tho n Oil explained that "[i]t is the objective of this opinion to resolve issues inher
ent in this litigation and also to add clarity and practical application of legal
principles that impact mining law. " 75 1 F. Supp. at 1 456 n. l.
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nancia1 incentives to monitor the development of the law and to pay
to

have unfavorable decisions removed from the books, so that they

can convincingly relitigate the issue and argue that the weight of
authority is on their side. 63 Few judges appear troubled by these
transparent efforts to manipulate the weight of authority.64
The litigation of insurance coverage for damages and clean-up
costs resulting from oil spills, chemical leaks, and other pollution
related events provides an example of this manipulation. As pollu
tion-related liability becomes increasingly common, particularly in
connection with environmental legislation such as CERCLA, which
imposes clean-up costs on those responsible for pollution-related
damage, questions of policy coverage have become increasingly im
portant in determining whether insurers are responsible for paying
these costs under general liability policies. 65 These coverage ques63 Repeat pl ayers have a similar incentive to insure that favorable decisions are
not overturned. See , e.g. , Roger Parloff , Rigging The Co mmon Law, AM. LAw. ,
Mar. 1992, at 7 4 ("a thriving black market has developed i n opinions, w ith top
dollar paid to keep them on- or off- the books. "). Some commentators suggest that
this motivation expl ains settlements in cases such as Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Ross Elect ric of Washington, Inc . , 685 F. Supp. 742 (W.O. Wash. 1988), in w hich,
on a partial motion for summary j udgment, the district court issued a pro-insur
ance company decision holding that the standard form liability insurance policies
did not cover response costs under CERCLA. Following the decision, the insur
ance company settled. Lawyers for Ross Electric described the settlement by stat
ing that Travelers agreed to pay " ultimately what we were asking for, even though
t hey won the summary judgment . . . . We got more money than we would have,
because they wished to have that decision on the record. That was clear i n the
negot iations. " Parloff, supra, at 7 7 (quoting John McKerricher, counsel for Ross
Electric).
64 An exception is Judge Earl J. Johnson of the California Appellate Division.
In a recent dissenting opinion in Slater v. Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Co., 278 Cal .
Rptr. 47 9 (Ct . App. 1 99 1 ), Judge Johnson criticized the majority opinion for giving
the impression that the "weight of authority " supported the defendant insurance
company's position.
[T]he "weight of authorit y " . . . is inconclusive on this issue. It is also de
ceiving, because it has been shaped in part by the well conceived l itigation
strategy of at least one of the insurance companies involved i n these appeals.
One important appellate decision . . . has been purged from the law books as
a result of a settlement agreement between that insurance company and the
successful appellant. A determined attempt was made to do the same in
another case.
!d. at 486 (footnotes omitted).
65 An example is t he legal doctrine i nterpreting the scope of pollution exclusion
clauses in general l iability insurance policies. I nsurance policies typically use a
number of standard contract terms. Many such standardized policies excl uded
coverage for pollution-related injuries, under so-called "poll ution excl usion
clauses." Pollution exclusion clauses denied coverage for pollution- related injuri es
unless the injuries arose from pollution that was "sudden and accidental . " For a
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tions are generally unimportant to policyholders except as they af
fect a particular case in which the policyholder seeks coverage for a
pollution-related injury.
The development of legal doctrine in this area is of far more
consequence for insurance companies, however.

Cases upholding

coverage for pollution-related damages threaten insurers with enor
mous liability for coverage.

One commentator has described the

resolution of insurance coverage for clean-up costs under CERCLA
as "a trillion-dollar question. " 66
Accordingly, vacatur and similar p rocedures have been used
frequently to erase decisions that broadly interpret pollution-related
insurance coverage. 67 Thus the Bankers Trust decision described
above, which constituted a strong pro-policyholder precedent that
general liability policies cover pollution cleanup costs, was erased at
a cost of more than the ad damnum , the insurance community pre
sumably viewing the ruling as far too damaging to remain on the
books. As one commentator observed, the ruling "should have es
tablished an important precedent that other policyholders seeking
coverage for environmental cleanup costs could cite. " 68
In another example, the Eleventh Circuit in Reliance Insurance
Co. v. Kent Corp. , 6 9 reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Reliance Insurance. The case addressed the
question of whether Reliance was responsible under a comprehen
sive policy for damages caused by an emission of hazardous gases
from Kent property during a fire. The district court had concluded
that the emissions constituted a polluting event which was excluded
under the pollution exclusion clause. 70
Although the circuit court did not reverse this aspect of the
district court finding, it held that summary judgment was prema
ture because questions of material fact remained as to the cause of
the damages. 71 It consequently found that the question of coverage
comprehensive description of the development of pollution exclusion clauses and
judicial interpretations of those clauses, see Averback, supra note 5 8 .
6 6 Parloff, supra note 6 3 , a t 76.
67 One commentator has stated that a random search of California decisions
showed that pro-policyholder decisions had been vacated more frequently than
those favoring insurers. Stacy Gordon, Vanishing Precedents , Bus. INs., June 1 5 ,
1 992, at 1 , 1 4.
6 8 !d. at 1 .
69 896 F.2d 501 ( l i th Cir.), vacated, 909 F.2d 424 ( l i th Cir. 1 990).
70 896 F.2d at 502-03 .
7 ! In particular, the court took a narrow view of "polluting event," focusing on
the question of whether a can of Toluol exploded or was burned in the fire and
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could not be resolved and that Reliance continued to have a duty to
defend. 72 Shortly after the opinion was issued, the parties settled
the litigation, and the circuit court's decision, which could be
viewed as broadening the obligations of an insurance company to
defend even under a broad interpretation of the pollution exclusion
clause, was vacated. 73
Similarly, an unpublished opinion by Judge Brucia on a motion
for summary judgment in State of New York

v.

Inwood Petroleum

Corp. , 74 interpreted National Union's coverage obligations broadly

in connection with an oil spill and upheld National Union's duty to
defend the insured against claims under New York state law for
clean-up costs.

The case was promptly settled.

The settlement

agreement provided that the settlement was contingent upon Judge
Brucia's vacating his decision. 75
Most recently, the California Appellate Division issued a pro
policyholder opinion in Montrose Chemical Corp.

v.

Admiral Insur

ance Co. 76 dealing with Montrose's insurance coverage for the dis

charge of hazardous waste. The opinion addressed, in particular,
the question of when hazardous waste contamination is said to "oc
cur" so as to trigger insurance coverage. Following issuance of the
decision, the Association of Defense Counsel of Northern California
requested the California Supreme Court to depublish the Montrose
decision, claiming that its holding was aberrational. 77 The Califor
nia Supreme Court has granted review of the Montrose decision,
and the case is pending, yet already the defense insurance bar has
advised the court in another pending case that the continued vitality
of the Montrose decision is questionable. 78
caused emission of hazardous gases. !d. at 503.
7 2 !d. at 504.
73 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Kent Corp. , 909 F.2d 424 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 990) (vacating
panel opinion in light of settlement).
74 State of N.Y. v. Inwood Petroleum Corp., No. 2 1 799-89 (Sup. Ct. Nass. Co.
Mar. 8 , 1 9 9 1 ) (on file with author).
75 State of N.Y. v. Inwood Petroleum Corp., No. 2 1 799-89, at 3 , � 4 (Sup. Ct.
Nass. Co. Nov. 1 8 , 1 9 9 1 ) (Stipulation of Settlement) (on file with author).
76 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1 992), review gran ted, 1 99 2 Cal. LEXIS 2 5 5 4
( 1 992).
77 See Letter from Kevin Walsh to California Supreme Court re Montrose
Chern. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. in Opposition to Request for Depublication (Apr.
8 , 1 992) (on file with author).
7 8 See Letter from Elizabeth G. Leavy to the Honorable Ina L. Gyemant re
Flintkote v. American Mut. (Mar. ! I, 1 992) (on file with author) (stating that
there is "good reason to believe" that the Supreme Court will either review or
depublish the Mon trose decision, in wh ich case "the decision can have no bearing
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It is hard to know how commonly insurance companies em
ploy these procedures. The very fact of vacatur, particularly at the
trial level, erases the evidence of the decision that the defendant
seeks to destroy.

Accordingly, it is not possible to determine,

through LEXIS searches or case reporters, how many decisions
have been destroyed. Nor is it possible to draw conclusions about
the extent to which these decisions, if preserved, might have been
useful in future litigation. Much of the information on disappearing
decisions takes the form of anecdotal evidence. This evidence sug
gests that the extent to which the insurance companies' efforts have
been successful is considerable. One insurance company lawyer has
been quoted as claiming close to a fifty percent success rate in get
ting adverse appellate court decisions wiped out.79
CONCLUSION

The effect of court-sanctioned vacatur, depublication, and simi
lar doctrines is particularly problematic in environmental litigation.
In addition to distorting the settlement process, vacatur may de
stroy the ability of third parties to use a decision for purposes of
collateral estoppel. It also frustrates the development of a complex
area of the law, causing parties to spend money to relitigate the
same issues and preventing future environmental actors from learn
ing their legal rights. Finally, destruction of decisions destroys ac
countability. Civil litigation in the environmental area, like much
civil litigation, supplements government oversight over private con
duct. Private causes of action operate not merely to compensate but
to uncover and deter conduct deemed detrimental to societal values.
Thus environmental litigants are properly viewed as acting, in part,
as private attorneys general through their use of the litigation
process.80
These attributes of litigation are most thoroughly eviscerated
by the destruction of decisions imposing liability. Erasing the find
ing of liability erases the statement to other potential actors that the
conduct was wrongful, that this defendant was responsible, and that
society requires payment for the consequences. Private civil litigaon the result in the present case").
7 9 Carrizosa, supra note 2, at 65-66 (quoting Ellis J. Horvitz of Horvitz &
Levy).
so
Cf Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., 7 5 6 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1 985) (refusing
to force litigants to continue as "private attorneys general" when they wished to
settle conditioned on vacatur).
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tion supplements government action through criminal, administra
tive,

and

civil

accountability.

enforcement

proceedings,

in

i m posing

this

Here t h e n l i e s t h e answer to t h o s e w h o would de

fend secrecy b y deferring t o the right of litigants to control the
course of their lawsuit . When the government has provided private
litigation as an adj unct t o government action, such litigation serves
a public purpose, and the disposition of that litigation should not be
l eft solely in the hands of the parties.

